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ACTION.
P:~ -Senure Di.charge q/'-Damages.-The plaintiff con-
tractcd wit h tle defeindants to play firA.- old mail and character business
for thirty-six weeks. At the cloa.c of the nineteenth week, the defend-
ants discharged the plaintiff without ftult on his part., who commenced
an action for breach of the contract during the next week. Beld, that
the action was not premature; ihl, also, that the plaintiff was entitled
to recover as daiages for the remainder of the term at the btipulated
rate, less what het actually earned or might have earned by the exercise
of reasonable diligence, with interest ; that having obtained another
contract within the line of his profession within the time of his original
contract with the defendants, the ,um which he might have earned
thereby to the time when his contract with the defendants expired,
should be deducted from the contract price with the defendants:
Sithcrlal v. lf e', 67 Me.
A SSUMPSIT.
Implied (ontrat-Ltention oi ]'arties.- n order to raise an implied
contract to pay for labor, it is not necessary that there shall have been
an intention oil the part of the laborer during his service to charge
theref)r; it is sufficient that the one for whom the labor is done expected
to pay fbr it. So, unless the work was done under circumstances justi-
fying the belief that no charge was intended, a liability arises, even
though no charge was in fact intended by the laborer during his ser-
vice : laIg. Alm'r of 0-awJbrl, v. Walker et al., 65 Mo.
In an action to recover the value of services rendered to a firm the
defence relied on was an alleged understanding between the parties that
plaintiff was to charge nothing for his services. The court having in-
structed the jury, that, as there was no express contract, defendants
were not liable if the services were rendered under circumstances justi-
fying their belief that no charge was intended, hed, no error to refuse
instructions to the effect that plaintiff could not recover, if at the time
the services were rendered they were understood by all the parties to be
gratuitous, or if' plaintiff did not then intend to charge for them. The
instructions given are equivalent to those refused : Id.
ATTORNEY.
Atthorilt- Rc'oe,,tIioa of-Papment to.-The authority of an attorney
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from tile original opinions
filed daring Oct. Term 1877. The cases will probably be reported in 5 or 6 Otto.
2 From lion. N. L. Freeman, Reporter; to appear in 84 Illinois Rdports.
3 From J. 1. Pl.-ifer, E~q., Reporter; to appear in 67 Maine Reports.
4 From J. l,ar Sio.kett. E-q., Reporter; to appear in 46 Maryland Reports.
G From T. K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 65 Missouri Reports.
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who has obtained a judgment for his client, continues in force until the
judgment is satisfied: White v. Johnson, 67 Me.
Payment to the attorney is payment to his client, and will protect the
officer against a suit by the latter for not enforcing the execution : Id.
Returning an execution to the creditor's attorney of record, at the
latter's request, will protect the officer against a suit by the creditor for
not returning it into the clerk's office : Id.
Though the attorney abuse his trust and be answerable to his client
in damages, such conduct is not to prejudice the officer, who is entitled
to regard him as the agent of his client in all the contingencies which
may arise in the prosecution of the suit, and all the processes adopted to
secure or collect the debt intrusted to his care : Id.
To constitute a revocation of the attorney's authority, notice must be
given. The opposite party, and all others interested, have a right to
presume that his authority continues, until notified to the contrary: Id.
BILLS AND NOTES. See Partnership.
Bill of Exchange-Presentment veceisary to hold the Drawer.-On a
suit by the endorsee or holder of an inland bill of exchange or draft
against the drawer, who is also the endorser, no recovery can be had
without proof of presentment to the drawee, or of facts constituting an
excuse for not presenting the same: Thayer v. Peck, 84 Ill.
BOND.
Reforniution of-Equity.-To justify the reformation of a bond which
has been assigned to a bona fide holder, for a valuable consideration. not
only must the alleged error be proved, but it must also be proved that
the assignee had notice of the error at the time of the assignment:
Foster v. Kingsley, 67 Me.
Thus, where a bond was erroneously written so that the maker by its
terms obliged himself to give a good title to an unencumbered estate,
when the understanding of the parties was that be should give a good
title of his interest only as mortgagor; held, that while the bond might
be reformed as between the original parties, yet after its assignment to
a third party without notice, a court of equity would not interfbre to
reform it; held, also, that notice of the existence of a mortgage upon
land is not notice that a bond by the owner of the equity of redemption,
to convey the laud by deed of warranty, is of necessity erroneously
written: Id.
BOUNDARY.
Metes and bounds in the description of premises control distances and
quantities when there is any inconsistency between them. This is a
familiar rule and is founded upon the principle that those particulars are
to be regarded in which error is least likely to occur : .orrow v. Whitney
et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
BROKER.
Len-P ndpaZ and Agent-Right of Broker to retain out of the
Proceeds of a Cargo sold by him for an Agent, Brokerage due him by
the Agent for the sale of other Cargoes not belonging to the same Prin-
cipal.-Brokers do not usually possess the right of general lien, though,
like other agents they may be in a situation to exercise the right of
particular lien: Barry v. Boninger, 46 Md.
A cargo of sugar was imported by S., A. & Co. under letters of credit
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from the plaintiffs dated July 27th 1875, and arrived in Baltimore
uider bills of Ilding in the name of the plaintiffs, in accordance with
the agreement between the plaintifis and S., A. & Co. as contained in
the letter of credit. Uponi the arrival of the vessel, S., A. & Co. gave
a receipt to the plaintiffs for the sugar specified in the bill of lading, in
which it was stated that they agreed to hold the sugar.on storage as the
property of' the plaintiffs, with, liberty to sell the same and account to
them for the proceeds, until the aniount of drafts drawn on S. & 13. of
London, in pursuance of the letter of credit, and accepted by them
against the cargo of sugar, should be satisfactorily provided for. The
cargo was sold to MeIK., N. & Co. of Philadelphia, through the defend-
ants as brokers, but before it was all delivered S., A. & Co. fhiled on the
26th of August. The defendants were then on the 27th of Augrust,
authorized to deliver the balance of the cargo and to draw for the pro-
ceeds. Upon the receipt of the money front the purchasers, the defend-
ants retained out of it the amount due them by S., A. & Co. for broker-
age in selling other cargoes imported by them and not belonging to the
plaintiff;. In an action brought, by the plaintiffs against the defendants
to recover the anmount so retained, it was held, 1. That the property in
the sugar was in the plaintiffs under the letter of credit and S., A. &
Co's. tru.-t receipt; 2. That the property in the sugar so being in the
plaintiffs the defendants had no lien upon it for, and could not retain
out of' it, the amount due by S., A. & Co., for brokerage effected for
them ; 3. That the only claim the defendants could legally assert against
the cargo of sngar or its proceeds, was for the amount of brokerage due
thei for effecting a sale of that particular cargo : .ld.
CO31IoN CARRIER. See Railroad.
NVeqligence-Jk1easitrc of Danages.-The plaintiffs intestate delivered
to the defendants' agent at Castin $24.90 to be forwarded to Belfast
and there delivered to one Beale, agent of the Continental Life Insurance
Company. The money was sent for the purpose of paying the intestate's
semi-annual premium on his life-policy, which would by its terms lapse
if premium was not paid on or befbre eightdays thereafter; of all which
the defendants' agent had notice, but failed to deliver fldmoney. Held,
that primarily the defendants would be liable in damages for the net
value of the policy on the day it lapsed, both parties having presumably
contemplated such damages from knowledge of the circumstances. Also,
held, that it was incutbent upon the plaintiff's intestate to use ordinary
care and take all reasonable measures within his knowledge and power
to reinstate himself with the insurance company or to reinsure, and
that he cannot recover damage for such loss as be might have thus pre-
vented : Grindle v. Eastern ExPress Co., 67 Me.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAtW. See Corporation.
Contract-Reyncedj Jr Enjrcenwnt-Powcr of Lmeislature to alter-
.Mand(mnts. -In modes of proceeding and of forms to enforce a contract,
the legislature has the control and may enlarge limit or alter them; pro-
vided that it does not deny a remedy or so embarrass it with conditions
and restrictions as seriously to impair the value of the right: Stte of
Tennessee "x eId. Bloinsteln v. Siteed, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
The Bank of Tennessee was chartered in the year 1838; and its charter
contained as its twelfth section the following provision: § 12. "Be it
VOL. XXVI.-43
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enacted, that. the bills or notes of the said corporation originally made
payable, or which shall have become payable, on demand, in gold or
silver coin, shall be receivable at the treasury, and by all tax collectors
and other public officers, in all payment for taxes or other moneys due
to the state." On the refusal of a collector to receive the same the
remedy was by writ of mandamus: Id.
A subsequent statute provided that the party tendering the tax might
pay his claim to the collector under protest, giving notice thereof to the
comptroller of the treasury. and that within thirty days thereafter he
might sue the officer making the collection. Held, that the legislature
had the right to make this change of remedy and that the obligation of
the contract was not impaired: 11.
CONTRACT. See Constitutional Law; United States.
CORPORATION.
Fo~feiture of CTarter-How the authority to institute such proceedings
may be conferred- Constitutional law.-While it is clear that proceed-
ings by scire facias, or otherwise, against a corporation for the fbrfeiture
of its charter, cannot be maintained, except by the sanction and author-
ity of the legislature, a special Act of Assembly for this purpose is not
required: Stite v. Consolidation Coal Co., 46 Md.
It is competent for the legislature, instead of passing a special Act
authorizing such proceedings to be instituted in a particular case, by a
general law to authorize suits for this purpose to be instituted at the in-
stance of private parties, as was done by the Act of 1818, ch. 177, see.
4, codified in Art. 12 of the Code; or to confer the power upon the
governor to cause the proceeding to be instituted in his discretion, when-
ever he may consider the public interests so require; and this power has
been conferred by see. 176 of-the Act of 1868, ch. 471 : Id.
Constitutional Law-Right to alter, repeal or annul Charters-Equi-
ty-ljunction to restrain the charge of excessive Tolls.-Where in the
original charter of a railroad company the legislature expressly reserved
the power to alter, repeal or annul the charter at pleasure, the question
whether a proposed amendment of the charter is wise or consistent with
the public interests and with the prosperity of the company, is one which
by the charter is made to depend upon the wisdom and discretion of the
legislature, and is not a question to be determined by the courts : Agner-
ican Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co. and Cumberland and P ennsyl-
vania Railroad Co., 46 Md.
This construction of the terms of the charter is part of the contract,
and all parties dealing with the company, acquire and hold their rights,
subject to the reserved power of the legislature, to alter, repeal or annul
the charter at its pleasure: Id.
And the court cannot presume that the power will be exercised by the
legislature arbitrarily or unjustly : Jd.
In the original charter of the Cumberland and Pennsylvania Railroad
Company, the legislature expressly reserved the power to alter, repeal or
annul the charter at pleasure. By the Act of 1876, ch. 64, modified by
the Act of 1876, ch. 80, the rates of toll authorized to be charged by
iaid company were reduced. Held, that the Act of 1876, ch. 64, was
a constitutional and valid law, and that the railroad company could not
lawfully exact or receive higher rates for transportation than that act
888
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pr,,vidh~z. kiid that the Act of 1876, el. 80, was also free from consti-
tutinal Ol4i,'eIh ,,,s: P.
On a bill tih-l by the American Coal Company against said railroad
complny, 1*,r an injunction, prohibiting the latter fron demanding or
receiving from the complainant higher rates for transporting coal over
the road of the defindant than were fixed and prescribed by the said
Act of 1876, ch. 64, it appeared that the complainant, which was a coal
mining company, with its train-road connecting with the railroad of the
delendant, and depending entirely upon the latter for the means of
tramsporting its coal to market, was specially damaged by the illegal ex-
actions by the defendant of excessive freights. ileld, that the complain-
ant was entitled to an injunction as prayed : Id.
COVENANT.
Of Scisia-Practicc-Bmrdea of Proof-Paramount Title.-Where
in an action on a covenant of scisin the defendant admits the covenant
and "legcs seisin in himself at the date of the deed, it devolves upon
him to prove the scisin, and if lie fails, the plaintiff will recover: ockb-
rll v. Proctor t al., 65 Mo.
The existence of a paramount title, whether asserted or not, is a
breach of the covenant of scisin, whether it be express, or be implied
by the words, "grant, bargain and sell." rd.
If a grantee fails to take possession of unoccupied premises conveyed
by his deed, or having taken possession abandons them, lie can recover
of his grantor nominal damages only for breach of his covenant of sei-
sin, unless tlherc was a hostile assertion of a paramount title : Id.
DAMAGES. See Action; Common Car'ier.
EJECTMENT
Oulstanding Title-Fraud.-A defendant in an action of ejeetment,
who lainms adversely to both the parties to a mortgage, which is due
and unsatisfied, cannot avail himself of the mortgage as an outstanding
title to defbat the action: .Iardwick v. Jones, 65 Mo.
It is no fraud on the part of the holder of several judgments to sell
under a junior judgment, notifying bidders of the lieu of those which
which are older: d.
A person claiming title to land does not forfeit his right by attempt-
ing to buy in a conflicting claim : Id.
It is no objection to the plaintiff's title in ejectment that he is not a
purchaser for a valuable consideration : Id.
EQUITY. See Bond; Cororalion; Executor.
ReLif in case of Fraud-Laches.-The power of a court of equity
to relieve against a judgment upon the ground of fraud in a proceeding
had directly for that purpose is well settled : Brown et al v. Count, of
Buena Vista, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
The power extends also to cases of accident and mistake. But such
relief is never given upon any ground of which the complainant with
proper care and diligence could have availed himself in the proceeding
at law. In all such cases lie must be without fault or negligence. If
he be not within this category, the power invoked will refuse to interfere,
and will leave the parties where it finds them. Lacies, as well as pos-
itive faLult, is a bar to such relief: Id.
Rief in-Miste- Toluntary Convjance.-In a suit in equity re-
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lief can only be granted in accordance with sonic one or more allegations
in the bill : Storer v. Poole, 67 Me.
A court of equity will not set aside a voluntary conveyance as between
the pArties, unless upon the ground of fraud actual or constructive: Id.
Nor is a mistake in law sufficient for that purpose, unless it occurs
under such circumstances that fraud, imposition or improper influence
may be inferred, or to prevent intolerable injustice; and the mi.take
must appear from the strongest and most satisfactory proof: Id.
To obtain relief on the ground of mistake, it must appear in the bill
'what it is that is relied upon; and the proof must follow the allegation,
so that the court may know precisely what is asked and what is the
relief sought: Id.
Pleading-Parties to the Record.-In the case of a general creditors'
suit, or where there is a fund in court and an order requiring creditors
to come in to participate in the distribution, the simple Ihet that a party
appears and files his claim, raises the presumption, that he intends to
make himself a party to the record: Thomas v. Farmers' Bank of
AXaryland, 46 Md.
Vhere a suit is instituted, not for the benefit of creditors generally,
but for the enforcement of some special right, as for the foreclosure of a
mortgage or the enforcement of a vendor's lien, and a third person desires
to come in and be made a party, he should, by some appropriate allega-
tion, make known the nature and character of his right. In the absence
of such allegation or statement of record, the mere flact that a .hoirt copy
of a judgment in favor of a third person was found filed with other judg-
ments in such an equity cause is not binding and conclusive record evi-
dence that such person became a party thereto. And in such case. iarol




Executor and Trustee-Remedy against Svreties for derastarit com-
mittd by an Ehecutor.-Although an executor strictly speaking may be
considered as a trustee, and as such may be held accountable in a court
of equity for a proper administration of the trust, yet it is clear that the
sureties maintain no such relation. On the contrary, their obligation
being one of contract, the remedy for a breach of it must, as a general
rule, be by an action at law on the bond : Edes v. Garey, 46 Md.
If th'ere be any exception to this general rule, there must be sleial
and pecidiar circumstances, making the exercise of jurisdiction necessary
to the protection of the rights and interests of parties : Id.
GOVERNMENT. See UnAited States.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Necessaries.-The husband is liable for necessaries furnished a wife,
who for good and sufficient cause has left his bed and board : Thoipe v.
Shapleigh, 67 Me.
One cannot furnish articles which are not necessaries and recover a
fraction of their value because they might have answered the purpose
of other articles which would have been necessaries : Id.
The articles furnished must be necessaries, suitable and proper, regard
being had to the condition of the parties, else no recovery can be had : .1d.
Tort by Wife-Presumption of ilusband's Coercion not conlusive.-
840
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Wlre an action is agii lt liu-hand and wife for a tort committe by the
will.. the liabilitv of, the husband necessarily follows from the existence
of the marital relation, and when, by the pleadings, this is not disputed,
a verdict that the wife is guilty di.poses (f the whole issue raised by a
joint plea, of not guilty : Pergison v. Brooks ct e.c , 67 Me.
The presumption that in case of tort committed by the wife in the
prese-nce of the husband the wife acts under coercion, is not conclusive;
and when it is repelled, the wifte'is responsible for wrongs done by her
in his company: Id.
The ancient doctrine of the common law, that a married woman cannot
be a trespasser by prior or subsequent assent, is so far modified by our
statutes giving them the power to manage and control their own property
that as to all acts done in their name and behalf for the enforcement of
their supposed rights in such property, they are responsible, like other
parties not under disability, for what they authorize or ratify : Id.
INTEREST. "
Speclial Rate- Coithua nce qt:-When a note is given on time, with
interest at the rate of twelve per cent., the holder after maturity receiving
interest by operation of law and not under the contract, is entitled to
six per cent. only : Duran v. .Ayer, 67 Me.
JUDGMENT. See lectment; Equity.
Parol EJ dence.-Parol evidence is admissible to show that certain
matters as to which a judgment is silent, were not adjudicated : Sweet
v. 3!aupin, 65 Mo.
Srre Facias agahist Terre-Tcnans-Descriptioa of the Land.-A
scire facias against terre-tenants is. so far as they are concerned, a pro-
ceeding strictly in rem, and it is essential that the land to be affected by
the judgment should be properly described : Tiondis v. Farmers' Baulk
of ry,,Wland, 46 Md.
Where, in a scire facias against terre-tenants, there is no sufficient
description of the lands appearing of record, either by the sheriff's return
or in the pleadings, the court cannot resort to the evidence offered to
the jury for the purpose of obtaining a description of the lands against
which to render the judgment: I,.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See -Partnership.
MIASTER AND SERVANT. See Action.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
qOifcer-Tort.-A municipal corporation is not liable for the torts of
its oflicers committed under color of their official capacity: Barbour v.
Ellsworth, 67 Me.
NATIONAL BANKS.
(Oastitution:l Law-Change of State Banks to Aratonal.-National
banks, as iederal agencies. are only exempted from state legislation so
far as it may impair their efficiency in performing the functions by
which they are designed to serve the government of the United States.
It is only when a state law incapacitates them from discharging these
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duties that it becomes unconstitutional : Thomas v. 'ar'rs' Dank ,"
Matryland. 46 Md.
Under the Maryland Act of 1865, eh. 144, a state bank beconing anational bank under a new nane n y still sue in its old name, a cire
facias on an old judgment obtained under its first organization. Such a
privilege is not in conflict with the Act of Congress: id.
OFFIcER. See Munic pal Corporation; United States.
PARENT AND CHILD.
Liability, of Fatherfor _eessaies.-There must be an express pro-
mise, or circumstances from which a promise by the fhther can be inferred,
to hold him liable for necessaries furnished his infant child by a third
person: aru:phy v. Ottenheimer, 84 Ills.
PARTNERSHIP.
Partnership Acconts-Bills and .otes-Burden of Proof-nad-
missibilt9 of Parol Evidence to contradict al change the bgal inl ort
of a Negotiable Note ia the hands of an E ndorsee- Statute ef Linita-
tions.-An action at law cannot be maintained by one pai tter against
another involving the state of the partnership accounts. But one partner
may sue another at law on a ,promise to pay a balance which has been
ascertained and agreed upon. And afortiori may an action at law be
maintained on negotiable promissory notes given by one partner to
another for the amount of the balance ascertained upon dissolution.
And it would not be competent for the defendant to defeat such action
by showing that there had been no final settlement of partnership
accounts: JTcSherry v. Brooks, 46 Mod.
An adjustment of their partnership affairs was made by agreement
under seal between S. and M3eS. as partners, which, by agreement, was
made subject to the future possibility of a change in the amount of the
assets that might be realized from the debts due the firm. If any col-
lections could be made on account of debts supposed at the time to be
bad or doubtful, MIeS. was to be entitled to a proportionate abatement
from the amount of certain promissory notes, which he gave to S. in
settlement of his proportion of the indebtedness of the firm ais ascer-
tained by said adjustment. While, on the other band, if, by the exer-
cise of due diligence, less could be realized than was supposed to be
good, MeS. was to be charged with a proportionate amount of said lo.s.
In an action against MeS. by the endorsee after hiaturity of these notes,
held, 1. That the onus was upon the defendant as to any collections
of such bad or doubtful debts as would entitle him to a credit upon the
notes ; 2. That, notwithstanding the notes were overdue from the time
they were made, yet, being made negotiable in form, they were neg'o-
tiable at the time they were transferred to the plaintiffs; S. That the
endorsees having taken the notes overdue, it would have been competent
for the defendant to avail himself of any equities that attached to the
notes themselves, or to show a want of consideration, or that they had
been transferred to the plaintiffs in trust for the maker; but not to
destroy their legal import and operation, by the introduction of parol
evidence of an agreement that the notes were not to be negotiated ; or
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that tley wore not to be ,tiild on until it should be ascertained whether
ccrtaiin ,d,ts co.hil be realized r not : 1(.
Wltt'it th ,)t." wvere ncarly out of date, the defendant was called on
by the holder of' them, and notified that unless sotoethitg was done suit
woull hie brought upon thlctt. Whereupon the defendant signed the
fillowi.n., entdorsemtent upon each of* the notes " Paid Dec. 16th 1872,
$5.0o on acet. of this note to revive the same :" 11ehl, that it the parol
evilence of the agreeneot. relied on by hin as a defence, were otherwise
adittinble, the defendant had effectually precluded himself from the
resort to such defence by said endorseient upon the notes : A.
Siuririhg Partner may cssitjn .ot.-Tie sole survivor of a firm
may as. igt a promissory note p:tyabhl to the late firm by endorsement,
so as to vest the legal title in tte assigncc, as efiectually as if the note
had been ttade payable to him : Johnson v. Bcrlizheiner, 84 Ills.
PATENT.
Iiifri.qennt-Form of In'cnton.-A mere variation in the form or
shape of* the itttrutcut cannot be successfully used to evade the mo-
nopoly. ]ut where form is of' the essence of the invention it is neces-
sarily material, and if the satne object can be attained by a machine
different in fbrm where that form is inseparable from the successful
operation of the instrunent, there is no infringement: Werner v. King,
S. 0. IU. S., Oct. Term 1877.
It is not only necessary to an infringement that the arrangement which
infringes should perfori the same service or produce the same effect,
but it must be done in substantially the same way : d.
RAILROAD.
Bagqage of one not a J'assenge'r -A railroad company is not obliged
to carry as baggage the trunk of' one who does not go by the same train.
Upon receiving the trunk of such person to be forwarded it is received
as freight, and tlt duties and liabilities ofa conmon carrier attach, with
the right to a reazonable coxupensation for transportation. Wilson v.
Grantl Trunk. 56 31e. 60, and 57 Id. 138, affirmed : Graffant v. Boston
& _1aine Railroad Co., 67 Me.
STATUTE.
L,'gislati'e adoption of OnistrUetion -The re-enactment of a statute
after a judicial constriction of its meaning, is a legislative adoption
of the statute as thus construed : Tuxbn'ry's A.ppeal, 67 Me.
SuccEssioN TAX. See Tax.
TAX.
U8 Succession Tax-Lien of-Bersonal Liabilil1 for.-A purchaser
of Lind. upon the descent, of which a succession tax is due under the Act
of Cottgress incurs no personal liability to pay it; but takes the title
subject to a lien for it : lilhlmi v. Wa7.de et al., 65 Mo.
No one can be made liable for payment of a share of the succession tax
due ot the descent ofa trart of land greater than his share in the land: Id.
Thie Act of' Congress does not authorize a sheriff. who has sold land
and collected the proceeds under an order of court in a partition suit, to
pay the succession tax due upot the descent of the land : Id.
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TELEGRAPHY.
.Non-deliver~y of 1fessage.-In an action by a father against a telegraph
company, for negligence in failing to deliver a telegram sent by him to
his son, summoning the son home to the deathbed of his mother, the
plaintiff is entitled to recover at least nominal damages, including the
price paid the company to send the despatch.: Logan v. TV. U. Tele-
graph Co., 84 Ills.
TORT. See Husband and Wife; Municipal Corporation.
TRIAL.
Absence of Judge during argument of the Cause.-It is error for a
judge before whom a case is being tried to leave the court room whilst
the cause is being argued before the jury, and be employed in other
official duties, leaving an attorney to preside in his place; and it is no
less error, that he is in another part of the building than if he were in
another county. The argument of a cause is as much a part of the trial
as hearing the evidence, and the parties are entitled to have the judge
present, and he cannot, even by consent of parties, be elsewhere em-
ployed : .Meredith v . The People, 84 Ills.
UNITED STATES.
Act of Congress relating to Officers of.-The Act of Congress of
June 2d 1862 entitled, "An Act to prevent and punish fraud on the part
of officers intrusted with the making of contracts for the government,"
requires such contracts to be in writing and is mandatory and not direct-
ory merely: Clark v. The United States, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
The government is not responsible for the laches or the wrongful
acts of its officers: Hart et al. v. The United States, S. C. U. S., Oct.
Term 1877.
WILL.
Presumption- General Intent- Converson.-No presumption of an
intent to die intestate as to any part of his property is allowable, when
the words of a testator's will may fairly carry the whole: Given, et al.
v. Hilton et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1877.
An apparent general intent to make by his will a complete disposition
of all a testator's estate cannot control particular directions plainly to the
contrary, or enlarge dispositions beyond their legitimate meaning: Md.
Such a general intent is of weight however in determining what was
intended by particular devises or bequests that may admit of enlarged
or limited constructions: Id.
When a will directs conversion of realty only for certain purposes
which are limited, for example, for the payment of particular legacies,
and follows the direction by a bequest of the residue of personal estate,
the conversion takes place only so far as the proceeds of the sale are
needed to pay the legacies prior to the residuary one, and the gift of the
personalty will not .carry the produce of the sale of the lands in the
absence of a contrary intent plainly manifested : Id.
A general direction to sell and apply the proceeds indiscriminately
to the payment of debts and legacies operates as a conversion out and
out: Id.
344.
